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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years the United States Supreme Court has
decided several contentious Fourth Amendment issues. In
interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme Court has developed
several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.1
Perhaps the most controversial interpretation came in the landmark
case Tery v. Ohio.2 The key concept in Terry is that an officer may do
a protective pat-down search, or Tery stop, of a person who the
officer believes, based on a reasonable articulable suspicion, is
planning, or is part of, a crime.3 Reasonable articulable suspicion is a
level of suspicion below probable cause. Consequently, the officer
does not need to obtain a warrant to conduct a pat-down under Terry.
The question of whether reasonable suspicion exists has created the
most debate. In Illinois v. Wardlow,4 the Court reviewed whether flight
of an unprovoked bystander in a high crime area (drug area) created
enough reasonable suspicion to allow Chicago police officers to
conduct a protective pat-down search under Terry. The Court
answered this question in the affirmative."
FACTS OF THE CASE
On September 9, 1995, two uniformed police officers, Officers
Nolan and Harvey, were part of a four-car caravan en route to an area
1. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997) (asserting that asking a passenger
to exit a vehicle is minimally intrusive when measured against the safety of the officer);
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
require the officer to obtain a warrant to search a sack in a moveable car even though the
officer lacked probable cause to search the car). See generally Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 111 (1977) (finding that under Terry, officers have an automatic right to ask a driver to exit
the car).
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. See id. at 24 (noting the unreasonableness of disallowing an officer to frisk a person,
whom he has reasonable suspicion to believe has a weapon, in lieu of obtaining a warrant).
4. No. 98-1036, 2000 WL 16315 (U.S.Jan. 12, 2000).
5. Id. at 5.
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of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking." As part of a special
operations section of the Chicago Police Department, the officers
were investigating drug transactions in the area.7 The officers in
charge of the operation expected to find a crowd of people engaged
in selling, buying, and watching for police.8
As the caravan approached 4035 West Van Buren Street, Officer
Nolan noticed William "Sam" Wardlow standing near a building and
holding an opaque bag.9 When Wardlow noticed the police caravan,
he immediately began to run in the opposite direction." The officers
pursued and watched Wardlow dart down a gangway and then down
an alley.11 The officers eventually cornered Wardlow on the street.'
2
Once cornered, Officer Nolan performed a protective pat-down
search of Wardlow Officer Nolan testified that, in his experience,
narcotics transactions and weapons are commonly found in the same
place.14 During the pat-down, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag that
Wardlow was carrying.'s Officer Nolan testified that he determined
that the object he felt in the bag felt like a weapon.6 When Officer
Nolan opened the bag, he revealed a .38-caliber handgun containing
several rounds of ammunition. Wardiow was arrested and charged
with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.
At Wardlow's first trial the trial judge denied a motion to suppress
6. See People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ill. 1998) (describing the circumstances
surrounding Wardlow's arrest).
7. See id. (noting the special nature of the police operation in the area of the arrest).
8. See Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, *2 (explaining why the Chicago police department
elected to approach the area of the arrest in the manner that they did).
9. See Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 485 (citing Officer Nolan's description of Wardlow's
actions).
10. See id. (describing the actions taken by Wardlow as he ran in the opposite direction of
the police).
11. Id.
12. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *2 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (noting Officer
Nolan's description of the scene at trial).
13. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (authorizing officers to conduct a protective pat-down search of
a suspected criminal).
14. See Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *2 (stating Officer Nolan's personal belief about the
relationship between narcotics and weapons).
15. See id. (recounting Officer Nolan's actions when he and Officer Harvey had cornered
Wardlow). But see Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (authorizing officers to conduct a pat-down of the outer
clothing of the suspect).
16. See id. at *2 (noting Officer Nolan's belief that the object he felt was a gun).
17. See Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 485 (describing Officer Nolan's actions after he determined
the object in the bag to be a gun).
18. See 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/24-1.1 (West 1961) (making possession of a firearm by a
felon a criminal offense).
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the gun as evidence. 19 The court found that the gun was discovered
during a lawful stop and frisk.20 Wardlow was convicted at the
conclusion of a stipulated bench trial. 1  On appeal, the Illinois
Appellate Court reversed the conviction, finding that the gun should
have been suppressed.22 The appellate court concluded that Officer
Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Ter rs and that Wardlow was not in a high crime
area.
24
The State of Illinois appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.2
While rejecting the appellate court's determination on the high
crime area issue, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the sudden
flight of Wardlow in such an area was insufficient to create the
required reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.2 6  The Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that, although officers have a right to
approach and question a person at will, the individual has no
obligation to respondY. Additionally, a person who decides not to
respond may walk away, and this alone will not be enough to justify
an investigative stop by the police.8 Officers must have, at the very
least, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to restrict a person's
movements.' The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that flight could
simply be an exercise of this right to "go on one's way."0 Hence,
without more, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to pat-
19. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *2 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (summarizing the
decision of the trial court).
20. Seeid
21. Seei&
22. See lWardlow, 701 NYE.2d at 486 (noting the approach taken by the Illinois Appellate
Court).
23. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 27 (concluding that reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed is
the standard for a stop-and-frisk).
24. See Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at486 (quoting the appellate court).
25. Id.
26. See id at 489 (finding that the appellate court had correctly decided that flight alone
was not enough tojustify a Terry stop).
27. See Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 486-87 (citing the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Florida v. Royer which allowed officers to approach a person and ask questions, but the
approached person was not required to answer unless the officers had reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, a determination of which must be made without regard to the person refusal
to speak with officers).
28. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983) (creating a standard of feeling free to
leave as a line beyond which requires reasonable suspicion to question).
29. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 27 (articulating reasonable suspicion as the standard for a
protective weapons sweep).
30. See Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 487 (citing People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (Mich.
1985)) (asserting that flight could simply be a person exercising his right to leave a scene, "at
top speed," and does not allow reasonable suspicion).
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down Wardlow.31
The Illinois Supreme Court took the analysis a step further and
found that flight in a high drug area alone did not create a
reasonable suspicion. Since the court could not find any
independent suspicious activity, the court ruled that the stop and
subsequent arrest violated Wardlow's Fourth Amendment rights.-"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 3, 19992"
and oral arguments were heard November 2, 1999.
HOLDING
In reversing the Illinois high court, the Supreme Court began by
reiterating the holding in Terry.s' Recognizing that an individual's
presence in a high crime area is alone insufficient to give the officer
the right to frisk under Terry,"6 the Court found the officer may
consider the relevant characteristics of the area in determining
whether further investigation is warranted. 7  Consequently, the
characteristics of the area have been allowed to be a relevant factor in
the determination of reasonable suspicion.' In addition to the
character of the area, the Court noted that prior decisions allowed
nervous or evasive behavior as a relevant factor for a reasonable
suspicion determination." The Court reasoned that "headlong
flight," while not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, serves as a
strong suggestion of wrongdoing.4
The Court stated that courts do not have empirical studies relating
31. See i& at 489 (finding that Officer Nolan needed more than a hunch to be allowed to
stop Wardow).
32. Id.
33. See id (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,488 (1963)) (noting that illegal
evidence must be suppressed).
34. 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999).
35. See Illinois v. Wardow, 2000 WL 16315, at *3 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (summarizing the
holding in Terry and its application to the Wardlow case).
36. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (stating that an individual's presence in a
high crime are alone cannotjustify a stop).
37. See Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *4 (noting that common sense does play a role in the
determination of reasonable suspicion).
38. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 (1972) (allowing presence in a high
crime area late at night to be a factor in reasonable suspicion).
39. See generally United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (finding that proof of
wrongdoing is not required to justify a stop); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per
curiam) (holding that the defendant's unusual movements aroused justifiable suspicion);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (noting that erratic behavior or
attempts to evade support reasonable suspicion).
40. See illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *4 (U.S.Jan. 12, 2000) (stating that evasion
is certainly suggestive of wrongdoing).
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to Tery stops detailing inferences drawn by police from suspicious
behavior.41 Reviewing courts cannot be expected to make scientific
determinations where none exist.12  Courts should employ
commonsense when determining reasonable suspicion."
Wardlow argued, as the Illinois Supreme Court found, that
allowing flight as a factor in reasonable suspicion determination
would undermine the Court's previous conclusions in Florida v. Royer"
and Florida v. Bosticki5 Both cases addressed the issue of whether a
persons' refusal to cooperate when approached by an officer without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause was enough to warrant
reasonable suspicion.46 The Court did not accept the analogy that
unprovoked flight is the same as a mere refusal to cooperate.47 Flight,
the Court found, is not the same as "going about one's business."48
Allowing an officer to investigate for unprovoked flight, under the
circumstances of Wardlow, was not inconsistent with a person's right
to refuse to cooperate.49  The Court agreed, as Wardlow and amici
asserted, that innocent reasons for flight exist."' However, the fact
that flight is not indicative of criminal activity does not establish a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.51  Most Teny analysis cases,
including Terry itself, involve a situation that is "ambiguous and
susceptible to an innocent explanation."52 While the conduct at issue
could have an innocent explanation, the facts have an equally
suggestive criminal explanation and Terry assumes that some
41. See i. (finding that courts cannot be expected to have hard facts in front of them when
determining reasonable suspicion).
42. It
43. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981).
44. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
45. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
46. Bostick 501 U.S. at 436; Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
47. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (holding that flight
and refusal to cooperate are not analogous occurrences).
48. It
49. See id. (surmising that an officer faced with the situation in Wardlow should be allowed
to consider flight as an element of reasonable suspicion since flight is more than a refusal to
cooperate); cf Roer, 460 U.S. at 498 (holding that an individual has a right not to cooperate
with police of the officer has approached the individual without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (admitting that "flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing
criminal activity").
50. See Wardkow, 2000 W. 16315, at *5 (admitting that the respondent is correct in his
assertion that there are innocent reasons for flight).
51. See i. (stating that a violation of the Fourth Amendment under the respondent's
theory requires more then was presented).
52. See cf Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7 (summarizing the facts to be an activity, such as walking
back and forth in front of a store front, that is generally viewed as innocent).
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innocent people will be caught in the net. 3 The Fourth Amendment
assumes the same risk as Teny under a probable cause examination.!'
DISSENT
The dissent agreed with the Court's rejection of a per se rule either
way on the flight issue."5 The dissenting justices were troubled by the
majority's acceptance of reasonable suspicion arising from the facts
of the case.56 Invoking the principles of Terry, the dissent argued that
the narrow exception recognized in Terry cannot apply in this case."'
Conceding the State's point, that flight can be based on criminal
reasons, the dissent noted that flight could also occur for completely
innocent reasons.5s With these varied reasons as a consideration, the
rejection of a per se rule is warranted and instead the several different
circumstances present will determine the rights under Teny.Y With
regard to the per se rule, the dissent stated:
The probative force of the inferences to be drawn from flight is a
function of the varied circumstances in which it occurs. Sometimes
those inferences are entirely consistent with the presumption of
innocence, sometimes they justify further investigation, and
sometimes theyjustify an immediate stop and search for weapons.
These considerations have lead us to avoid categorical rules
concerning a ]erson's flight and the presumptions to be drawn
therefrom ....
The dissent reasoned that unprovoked flight describes a category that
is too broad to adopt a per se rule to deal with 1
Employing a totality of the circumstances analysis, as the majority
53. See Illinois v. Wardow, 2000 WL 16315, at *5 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (asserting that the
risk of stopping innocent people, balanced against officers' safety in the field, is an acceptable
compromise).
54. See gnerally Johnson, 333 U.S., at 14 (noting that the reason officers must seek a neutral
magistrate's determination of probable cause is because officers, "often engaged in the
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," are unable to make objective determinations of
the evidence).
55. See Wardow, 2000 WL 16315, at *6 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,JJ., dissenting)
(agreeing with the majority on rejecting a per se rule of flight alone satisfying reasonable
suspicion).
56. See id. (articulating dissatisfaction with the record's facts and the determination of
reasonable suspicion based on them).
57. See id (reminding the Court that Teny established a narrow exception to the
requirement of probable cause to question).
58. See id at *7 (articulating the question presented to be the degree of suspicion that
attaches to flight alone or in conjunction with other circumstances).
59. ML
60. I& at*8
61. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *9 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (finding flight an overly broad category of action).
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did, the dissent concluded that there are too many questions of fact
to determine whether the two factors cited by Officer Nolan are
sufficient to justify a Teny stop. 2 Officer Nolan's testimony is too
vague to truly ascertain what the circumstances were surrounding the
flight of Wardlow." The dissent also noted issues related to the
designation of the area as a "high crime area."6 Like flight, high
crime area is too general a designation for meaningful analysis.65
Concluding, the dissent noted that it is the State's burden to
articulate reasonable suspicion, a burden not met in Wardlow.
6
IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES
The Wardlow majority's allowance of reasonable suspicion based
solely on the high crime area and flight raise a pair of equally
important concerns. First, flight carries with it several interpretations
regarding what it is and whether it actually occurred. Second, high
crime area is extremely subjective and difficult to accept as a general
concept.
As the dissent notes, flight from the scene can occur for several
reasons. 67 The person may simply be attempting to catch up with a
friend who has gone ahead of him, or he may discover that he is late
for some engagement and must hurry to that place. The real
question is what constitutes flight? Flight could either be a flat out
run away from the police or a skulking slide away from the area
where the police are located."' Ambiguity in the definition of flight
raises some serious concerns. The majority asserts that any
determination assumes that some innocent people will be stopped
and patted down.69 One problem with making flight a determinative
factor in the decision whether to detain someone is that some
citizens, especially minority citizens, may be predisposed to flee from
62. Id.
63. See id at *10 (citing Officer Nolan's terse testimony as strengthening the assertion that
key facts are too vague).
64. See id. at *11 (questioning the majority's reliance on the vague concept of a high crime
area).
65. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,52 (1979).
66. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *11 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the burden of proving reasonable suspicion is on the state).
67. See i& at *8 (stating that it is common knowledge that people flee a scene for a
multitude of reasons, the least of which could be innocent in nature).
68. See id. at *8 (asserting that a reasonable person might feel that the presence of police
in the area will inevitably bring violence).
69. See id. at *5 (citing the assumption that Teny makes with regard to catching innocent
people). See also Tery, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (questioning the position that the intrusion by an
officer in a stop-and-frisk is too great).
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police.7 ' Additionally, since police sweeps occur disproportionately in
depressed areas of the city, where drug related violence tends to be
centered. In these areas, people on the street may flee to seek shelter
from a possible police gunfight or violence. Detaining people for
protecting themselves from violence sends a negative message to
minority citizens who should expect to be protected from the
violence by the police and not stopped at every chance the officer
have.7'
The designation of an area as "high crime" also carries some
concerns. What factors define a high crime area? Is that area
designated high crime because police patrol efforts are concentrated
there or because there is actually a high occurrence of crime? Who
decides that the area is high crime? These are all questions the
majority in Wardlow elected not to answer. In fact, the majority
accepts as fact the officer's testimony that the area was high crime
without meaningful exploration of the issue.72 High crime area is a
subjective assessment of an area that is likely to be very depressed."
Courts may want to consider viewing officer assessments of urban
areas with more skepticism than they do currently. To base
reasonable suspicion on a person being present in a high crime area
generalizes reasonable suspicion beyond its original intent.
7
Reasonable suspicion must be articulable. It seems that the officers
could articulate nothing more then general assumptions about the
area and Wardlow's presence in that area.75
How will Wardlow impact racial profiling cases? 76 Racial profiling is
not a new concept and is based on the same general stereotypes and
circumstances under which the Wardlow court allows this search 7
70. See generally Paul Butler, 'Walking While Black. Encounters with the Police on My Stret,
LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23-26 (describing an encounter that the author had with D.C.
police on the front steps of his own house).
71. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEV TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF
RACIAL PROFILING at 45-82 (N.J. Apr. 20, 1999) (detailing the effects of racial profiling to
include a disregard for officer orders and a loss of faith in the police's ability to ensure
community safety).
72. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (accepting the
presumption that the area was known for high narcotics trafficking).
73. See generally Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (noting that high crime area, alone,
cannotjustify reasonable suspicion).
74. See Terry 392 U.S. at 21-22 (1968) (articulating that reasonable suspicion is a standard
that still requires a level ofspecificity to allow a search without a warrant).
75. See Ward low, 2000 WL 16315, at *4 (stating that the officer stopped Wardlow because he
was in an area of expected criminal activity and he fled upon seeing the police).
76. SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (concluding that pretextual traffic
stops will be viewed under an objective standard as to their legality).
77. See generally United States v. Prandy-Binett, 995 F.2d 1069, 1075 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(Edwards, J., dissenting) (arguing that the real reason the defendant was stopped was based on
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Admittedly, some officers possess experience allowing them to more
accurately predict events, but that experience is too vague to be the
bases of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 8 Proof of the
circumstances surrounding the encounter in this case should have
been a prerequisite to a finding of reasonable suspicion. To this end,
a factual determination of the time of day, the officers' attire, the
vehicle carrying the officers, and the nature of the area the officers'
patrolled only allow the Court find that there was reasonable
suspicion,79 but does not establish reasonable suspicion. To allow
judicial determinations without factual bases may cause similar
problems to those encountered in racial profiling and pre-textual
traffic stops.8O
Another concern raised by Wardlow is its effect on the principle
announced in Terry. Terry carved a very narrow exception to the
warrant requirement and this exception was only triggered under
special circumstances. Over the years, the Court has expanded the
Terry exception to include several related circumstances.82 Debate
over Terry's relevance is only exacerbated by this decision. The
concern is that the pat-down exception realizes the dissent's fear in
Terry by authorizing searches by officers with only limited reason to
do so.ss The greatest concern centers on how substantial a factor an
officer's gut feeling plays in deciding who to stop as opposed to a true
articulation of the circumstances that lead him to stop and frisk the
suspect. This is not the first extension of the Terry search, since
the color of his skin and not the nature of the package he was carrying).
78. See generally United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (citing
testimony of Agent Markonni regarding the creation of the drug courier profile).
79. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000 WL 16315, at *10 (U.S.Jan. 12, 2000) (asserting that more
facts could add to a determination of reasonable suspicion).
80. See Angela Anita Allen-Bell, The Birth of the Crime: Driving While Black (DWB), 25 S.U.L.
REV. 195, 218 (1997) (describing the disproportionate amount of minorities stopped on
Interstate 95 in Florida).
81. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 27 (stating that there needs to be a "narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons").
82. See, eg., Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (finding that officer
safety justifies allowing the officer to order a driver out of the car without a reasonable
articulable suspicion). See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (allowing a search
incident to arrest even though, prior to the search, the officer had removed the occupants of
the car); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that the search incident
to arrest was allowed under the Fourth Amendment, even in the car setting); Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1973) (finding the same as Robinson); United States v. Rusher,
966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir. 1992) (invoking the Terry doctrine to examine the legality of drugs
taken during the stop); cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1969) (allowing the
protective search of a house to protect officers and preserve evidence).
83. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 38 (voicing concerns with allowing officers to search on less then
probable cause and removing the magistrate from that determination).
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similar expansion of the automobile exception has occurred."4
CONCLUSION
At the center of Tery is an officer's right to do a protective pat-
down of the outer clothing of the suspect where reasonable
suspiction exists. The Wardlow majority correctly held that flight
should be a factor in the determination of reasonable suspicion.
Concern develops over the weight flight is given by the majority. The
Court ignores social realities, replacing them with idealistic
aspirations of the state of urban America. Ultimately, the Court has
afforded flight too much weight, providing minimal Fourth
Amendment guidance to the lower courts who will spend
considerable time sorting out the implications of Wardlow.8
TERRYL. GODDARD, JR.
84. Compare Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 n.6 (finding that officer safety justifies allowing the
officer to order a driver out of the car without a reasonable articulable suspicion), and
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (reasoning that officers should be allowed to
conduct an area search of a car if reasonable articulable suspicion exists), with Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (finding that a search and seizure of contraband in a car,
conducted without a warrant, is valid if that search is based upon a reasonable belief arising
from the circumstances that the automobile contains items subject to seizure).
85. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (noting that courts should apply a
totality of circumstances test in deciding whether a reasonable person was free to end the
seizure).
